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The American workplace is highly sexualized, mirroring a society
where sexual bantering and flirtation are commonplace. The problem
of sexual harassment, however, goes far beyond such mutually agreea-
ble contacts to situations where a woman is subjected to repeated and
unwelcome sexual advances, derogatory statements based on her sex,
or sexually demeaning gestures or acts. She is often made to feel de-
graded, ridiculed, or humiliated while she is working or threatened
with adverse job consequences if she does not yield to sexual advances.
The harassment takes an emotional, physical, and economic toll: wo-
men placed in this situation do not perform well on the job and often
quit rather than continue to work in a threatening environment.
Although sexual harassment has existed in the workplace since wo-
men entered the work force, it is only now coming into public view as a
significant legal problem. The identification of sexual harassment as an
important issue coincides with the rapid increase of women in the work
force and a concomitant upsurge of feminist activities throughout the
country. Women are feeling less powerless and are encouraging each
other not to accept the harassment previously considered an unavoid-
able part of a woman's worklife.
There has been an increasing awareness of sexual harassment in the
workplace and growing testimony to its seriousness. Every United
States Circuit Court of Appeals presented with this issue has held that
sexual harassment violates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' In
1979 the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service held hearings on sexual harassment in the
federal government. At the conclusion of the hearings, the subcommit-
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tee requested that the Office of Personnel Management issue a policy
statement defining sexual harassment and declaring it a prohibited per-
sonnel practice. The subcommittee also requested that the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board conduct a study of the scope of sexual
harassment in the federal employment sector and that the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) improve its processing of
sexual harassment complaints.2 As a result of this new visibility, prac-
tices previously viewed as acceptable behavior are being redefined as
unacceptable. The issue now has a name, and the parameters of what
constitutes sexual harassment are being defined.
Sexual harassment is less an expression of sexuality than of power,
whether real or desired. In this respect, it is analogous to rape and
exemplifies the same "conscious process of intimidation."' There are
several reasons why this expression of power is possible in the work-
place. Continued job segregation and employment discrimination
maintain a profile of the work force in which men are in positions of
power and in positions to exploit that power. Women remain concen-
trated in the lower-paying, traditionally female occupations, compris-
ing 80% of the country's clericals, 63% of the service workers, and 64%
of retail sales workers.
Although women comprised two-fifths of the work force in 1979,
the median weekly earnings of female wage-earning and salaried work-
ers was approximately 62% that of male workers.' In spite of civil
rights legislation and the prominence of affirmative action, this differ-
ential has remained essentially unchanged since 196 1.6 Even within the
same occupation groups, women's earnings rarely approach the earn-
ings of men.7 This disparity can be attributed, in part, to the record
influx of women into the work force, many at entry-level, and to their
decisions to choose traditionally female jobs. The fact remains that fe-
male earnings are low. The few statistics that exist concerning sexual
harassment reveal that a large portion of the harassment that women
experience is caused by their male supervisors.' The structure of the
2. Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investiga-
ions, House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1980 Hearings]. In September 1980, the agencies reported back to the House
Committee regarding their compliance with those requests. See note 8 infra.
3. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILLS: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15 (1975).
4. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TWENTY FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS 1 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as TWENTY FACTS].
5. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT GOALS OF THE WORLD PLAN OF
-ACTION: DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 10 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as EMPLOYMENT GOALS].
6. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN MEN AND WO-
MEN 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EARNINGS GAP].
7. EMPLOYMENT GOALS, supra note 5, at 10.
8. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORK FORCE, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980) (submitted to




work force reflects male dominance in society and puts men in a posi-
tion to exploit that dominance.
Women are also harassed by male colleagues. Although not in po-
sitions of power in the employment context, they view themselves, as
men, as having power at least over women; that power often is ex-
pressed through harassing behavior. This situation has been exacer-
bated by the extraordinary increase during the 1970's in the number of
women in the work force.9 At the same time, some men in the work
force are experiencing personal pressure from the women in their fami-
lies who are reacting in many different ways to the current surge of
feminism. Often, the anger and frustration that they feel toward wo-
men cannot be expressed in their personal relationships and is dis-
played in the employment context. Incidents of harassment are thus
likely to increase in the coming years.
Discussions of sexual harassment often advert to racial harassment
cases and the general principles expressed in those cases. The refer-
ences are, however, confusing and contradictory, and analogies are un-
clear. For example, there is a statement in the EEOC Guidelines on
sexual harassment to the effect that the principles in the guidelines will
also apply to cases of racial harassment.' ° On the other hand, in Barnes
v. Costle, the court noted that sexual harassment cases differ from ra-
cial harassment cases.l" The fact remains that although racial and sex-
ual harassment cases are similar, they are also distinguishable. The
relationship between the two, however, has not been carefully explored.
This article will examine both forms of harassment and attempt to
clarify the nexus between them in order that sexual harassment issues
be better understood. In particular, it will suggest that there are two
analytical models for sexual harassment cases: (a) a generalized harass-
ment model, which parallels racial harassment, and (b) a sexual ex-
ploitation model, which is analogous to rape. After discussing this
analysis, the article focuses on sexual harassment as it applies to black
women, a group that is uniquely vulnerable to sexual harassment, and
that is caught in the interstices between sex and race. The article will
further argue for the recognition of the category of sex-race discrimina-
tion, a recognition that will aid in the analysis and proof of cases of
discrimination against black women.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND RACIAL HARASSMENT
As both racial and sexual harassment are both an expression of
dominance and control by one group over another and a process of
intimidation to maintain a certain social structure, they have the same
9. In 1975, there were 37 million women in the labor force; by 1979, the number had jumped to
43 million, greatly outpacing male gains in the labor force. EMPLOYMENT GOALS, supra note
5, at 3.
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
11. 561 F.2d 963, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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underpinnings. The two forms of harassment are sometimes mani-
fested in the same power statement: racial harassment often takes on
sexual overtones, and sexual harassment often takes on racial over-
tones.12 Sexual harassment has been carried to its extreme in the rape
of black and white women; racial harassment has been carried to its
extreme in the lynching and castration of black men. Power in society
is demonstrated by who has sexual power over whom.'
3
Although both racial and sexual harassment stem from the exercise
of power, there are important differences. The unique history of black-
white relationships in this country and the unique character of male-
female relationships have led to differing perceptions of discrimination.
The history of enslavement has put black oppression into an easily
identifiable and understandable category. For example, one outgrowth
of the slave history was the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, which prohibited slavery, granted former
slaves the right to vote, and guaranteed protection from state denials of
due process or equal protection of the laws. While concerns over race
discrimination have found expression in the Constitution, the Equal
Rights Amendment still awaits ratification.
The opinions issued by the Supreme Court reflect society's diver-
gent perceptions of racial and sexual discrimination. Classifications
based on race are inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny under the equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Classifications based on sex, however, are not consid-
ered inherently suspect.' 4 For example, Justice Powell, writing for the
majority in Bakke v. Regents of the University of California,'5 explained
the differences in the levels of scrutiny.
[T]he perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems
from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based classifications do
not share .... [T]he Court has never viewed such classifications as
inherently suspect or as comparable to racial and ethnic classifications
for the purpose of equal protection analysis.'
6
As the Court noted in PersonnelAdministrator of Massachusetts v. Fee-
ney," when "classifications. . .in themselves supply a reason to infer
antipathy, [r]ace is the paradigm."'" To the extent that historical and
12. See, e.g., DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 800 (1st Cir. 1980), where one of the threaten-
ing notes left for a male worker stated, "Hey boy get your Black ass out before you don't
have one"; for a discussion of the sexual harassment of black women, see also section of text
entitled SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF BLACK WOMEN infra.
13. For further discussion of this point, see S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 3; A. HIGGINBOTHAM,
JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR (1978); W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTi-
TUDES TOWARDS THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968).
14. Classifications according to race, alienage, and ancestry are inherently suspect. Only a show-
ing of a compelling state interest will justify such a classification. See generally Mass. Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
15. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Id. at 303.
17. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
18. Id. at 272.
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social perceptions of sexual discrimination differ from perceptions of
racial discrimination, sexual discrimination will not be viewed by the
courts with the same degree of concern.
"Proximity," the degree of distance which can be maintained within
the two groups, also has an important bearing on society's perception of
discrimination. Race and power can sometimes be dealt with in an
abstract manner: one can be insulated from racial tensions by geogra-
phy, social position, or wealth. Sex and power, however, are daily is-
sues that are always perceived in an intimate and personal way. As a
result, it is in the best interest of the dominant class in society that the
magnitude of the sex-power problem remain obscure in order to main-
tain the status quo.
CATEGORIZATION OF HARASSMENT CASES
Because sexual and racial discrimination have underpinnings that
are both different and the same, it is not surprising that the two forms
of harassment are manifested in ways that are both similar and dissimi-
lar. The categorization of harassment into a generalized harassment
model and an exploitative-harassment model facilitates the analysis of
racial and sexual harassment issues. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Murphy Motor Freight 9 exemplifies the generalized har-
assment model in a racial discrimination case. Racial epithets were
written on the walls of the plant, the black employee was isolated by his
coworkers in the company lunch area, and his car tires were slashed.
The district court found the company's working environment to be per-
meated with racial harassment and intimidation. Brown v. City of Guth-
rie,20 on the other hand, presents a case of generalized sexual
harassment. In that case, plaintifi's supervisor and colleagues (all po-
lice officers) subjected her to lewd comments and gestures, displayed
pornographic pictures and made comparisons with her body, and
replayed and commented upon video tapes of strip searches of female
prisoners. A variation of this generalized harassment model occurs
when an employer subjects a female employee to harassment by others
who do not work with her. For example, in Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission v. Sage ReaZy Corp. ,21 the female employee was dis-
charged for refusing to wear a provocative and revealing costume
during her employment as an elevator operator. The court held that
this job requirement, which subjected the complaining employee to
harassment by the public, constituted a term or condition of employ-
ment made unlawful by Title VII.
The pattern of generalized harassment which usually appears in all
racial harassment cases does not appear in all sexual harassment cases.
19. 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980).
20. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
21. [19811 4 EMPL. Pa.c. GUIDE (CCH) (24 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 19, 163 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1981).
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There is a model of harassment unique to sexual harassment, the ex-
ploitation-harassment model. This model involves pressure upon a wo-
man for sexual favors with an implicit or explicit statement that
noncompliance will jeopardize her employment situation.
This form of sexual harassment presents two basic problems in the
public mind. One difficulty with the exploitation cases is that they lack
a ready framework for analysis. The generalized sexual harassment
cases can be dealt with much like the racial harassment cases. Women
making an analogy to racial harassment can "bootstrap" claims of sex
discrimination onto the racial analysis. Those claims might receive,
therefore, the greater consideration that is given racial discrimination
in the legal system.
Another problem is that the line between flirtation and sexual ex-
ploitation may be a subtle one. Exploitation is sometimes difficult for
even women to recognize and more difficult to demonstrate to others.
In the generalized harassment cases, either racial or sexual, a cause of
action arises when an employee has been ridiculed, intimidated, or de-
graded because of his or her sexual or racial identity. In the exploita-
tion cases, however, the normalcy of male-female sexual interaction
and the "normalcy" of male aggression and dominance cloud the issue;
courts are unsure if a cause of action is present. As the district court
noted in Barnes v. Costle, plaintiff introduced evidence of an "inharmo-
nious personal relationship" but not of a Title VII violation.22 The ex-
ploitation cases also raise the fear that men engaged in harmless
flirtation will somehow find themselves in violation of the law, victims
of character assassination. It has been suggested, therefore, that
charges of exploitation harassment be corroborated.23
The concerns raised about the legitimacy of sexual harassment
complaints are similar to those raised about rape charges: (1) a fear of
malicious prosecution and a concomitant need for corroboration; (2) a
generalized feeling that sexual encounters are a "natural phenomenon"
and that it is inappropriate to invoke the law to deal with them; and (3)
the view that women somehow invite the unwanted sexual attention.24
Therefore, in order to understand the fears and evidentiary problems
raised by these similar issues, it is better to analogize exploitation cases
to rape, rather than to the generalized harassment cases. It is useful to
examine the well-reasoned decision in Heelan v. Johns-Manville
Corp. ,25 an exploitation-harassment case, to see how the trial judge
scrutinized the evidence in the case, assessing the credibility of the wit-
nesses. The court held that "sexual harassment of female employees is
22. See note I supra.
23. Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investiga-
tion of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 11, 67, 110,
122-24 (1979).
24. C. MACKENNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 47-48 (1979).
25. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
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gender-based discrimination which can violate Title VII."'2 6 The opin-
ion is significant because it illustrates that sexual exploitation cases can
be presented within the framework of Title VII.
Categorization of sexual harassment cases into a generalized model
or an exploitation model facilitates legal analysis by providing a clearer
understanding of the analytic relationship between sexual and racial
discrimination cases. One can determine when legal analogies will be
relevant and helpful. The following principles, developed in racial har-
assment cases, have been applied appropriately to both types of sexual
harassment: (1) one incident of harassment generally does not rise -to
the level of a Title VII violation;27 (2) harassment which is harmful to
plaintiffs working environment may constitute a violation of Title
VII. 28 Another principle that emerged in a broad-based sexual dis-
crimination case holds that the existence of sexual harassment is proba-
tive on the existence of other kinds of sexual discrimination.29 This last
principle should be followed in all harassment cases.
Another developing concept is that when only one person com-
plains of harassment, plaintiffs case is weakened.3" The courts seem to
be searching for a statistical pattern to support the individual claim of
harassment. Repeated incidents of harassment are more probative in
generalized harassment cases, where it seems unlikely that only one of
a group would be singled out for harassment. Statistical evidence,
however, is of limited value in the exploitation-harassment cases, where
the selection of one female as a sex partner is not at all unlikely. As the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted in Barnes v.
Costle, a cause of action for sexual discrimination can be maintained
under Title VII, even though no other individual of the same gender
26. Id. at 1388.
27. EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight, 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980) (racial harassment);
Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (sexual harrass-
ment).
Where the harassment is of an extreme nature, however, more than one incident should
not be required before the victim can seek the protection offered by Title VII. See Taub,
Keeping Women in Their Place- Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345, 375-77 (1980).
28. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1971) (racial har-
assment); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (sexual
harassment).
See also Bundy v. Jackson, - F.2d -, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The D.C. Circuit applied the Rogers "work environment" theory to a case of sexual harass-
ment, holding that plaintiff need not prove that the harassment caused a tangible loss of job
benefits to make out a Title VII violation, where the employer created or condoned a dis-
criminatory work environment.
29. Dacus v. S. College of Optometry, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 963 (D. Tenn. 1979); see also
Bundy v. Jackson, - F.2d -, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981), where the
court eased plaintiff's burden of proof on her claim of discriminatory denial of a promotion,
as she had already proved that she was the victim of sexual harassment. Id. at 1165-68.
30. Edwards v. Foucar, Ray & Simon, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1644 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(racial harassment); Munford v. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (sexual
harassment); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37 (D.D.C. 1980) (sexual harass-
ment).
[Vol. 8:30
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was mistreated in the same way.3 Finally, another principle concerns
the duration of the harassment before a complaint was lodged. When
generalized harassment occurs over a long period of time, the court will
permit, for purposes of liability, an inference that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment.32 When, on the other hand,
harassment of the exploitation type continues over a long period of
time without notice to the employer, the courts will not infer notice.
They presume that they are being presented with either a personal rela-
tionship that has soured or a mere annoyance.33 Although both infer-
ences seem appropriate to the kind of harassment presented, it is
important to recognize that even when dealing with a personal relation-
ship that has soured, a woman can be sexually harassed by someone
with whom she has had a mutually desired relationship. If courts ana-
lyze the kind of sexual harassment with which they are confronted,
they will be better able to apply the appropriate principles developed in
both racial and sexual harassment cases.
REMEDIES FOR SEXUAL AND RACIAL HARASSMENT
Remedies for harassment must be developed to provide better pro-
tection to both women and minority men. No matter what kind of har-
assment they experience, it is rare that plaintiffs will be made whole,
even though the courts have been granted full equitable powers under
Title VII to fashion complete relief.34 Some of the racial harassment
cases present a unique pattern: a black male, who has been harassed
over a period of time, physically attacks his tormentors in retaliation
and is fired. Courts have uniformly held that an employer does not
violate Title VII by discharging the black worker without discharging
those who harassed him.35 A comparable situation exists in sexual har-
assment cases, where the court finds discriminatory harassment, but re-
fuses to reinstate the plaintiff due to the tensions and hostilities
generated by the situation.36 Two questions must be asked, however:
31. 561 F.2d at 993.
32. Croker v. Boeing, 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1194 (E.D. Penn. 1977). But see Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cit. 1979) (strict liability imposed on employer where supervisor
harassed employee without knowledge of the employer); EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(c) (1980) (employer is liable for acts of its agents whether acts were authorized or
forbidden by the employer and whether the employer knew or should have known of those
acts).
See also J. VERMEULEN, EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT BY SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES (1981) (to be reprinted in 10 CAP. U. L. REV. - (1981)).
Ms. Vermeulen argues that the elements of proof required for employer liability in a sexual
harassment case under Title VII should not be more stringent than those in other Title VII.
cases and that the addition of tort concepts such as notice are not only unwarranted but
unnecessary.
33. Bundy v. Jackson, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 24 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1155 (D.C. Cit. 1981); see notes 28-29 supra. Seealso Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
34. See Albemarle v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Edwards v. Foucar, Ray & Simon, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1644 (N.D. Cal.
1980).
36. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
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(1) Who generated the tensions and hostilities?; and (2) Who is being
asked to pay for the creation of the tense situation with loss of employ-
ment? These two situations are not identical. Clearly, physical attacks
cannot be tolerated on the job; however, in both situations, the person
who was harassed pays for defending his or her rights by losing a job.
Our courts should structure a more equitable outcome.
Cases of racial or sexual harassment inevitably generate enormous
amounts of anger and tension; reinstatement could always be denied
for that reason. This outcome, however, is basically unfair. The person
discriminated against loses a job, while the person who violated the law
remains employed. A backpay award is often inadequate to recom-
pense a plaintiff or to deter future harassment. Especially in recession-
ary times, workers will not dare to complain about harassment, if they
fear they will win on the principle but lose employment. The best rem-
edy is to reinstate the discriminatee at his or her previous job in a non-
harassing situation.37 If this is not possible due to an unavoidable,
close working relationship with the harassing individual, then the
harassing individual should be moved to a different part of the com-
pany. If transfer of the harassing individual is not possible, then the
discriminatee should be offered a comparable job in another part of the
company. Finally, if for some reason (for example, size of the com-
pany) reinstatement is not possible at all, the employer should be re-
quired to give "front pay" to the discriminatee. Front pay, a sum of
money sufficient to provide time for him or her to find comparable em-
ployment,38 should be added to the backpay award. Its payment would
come closer to compensating the discriminatee for loss of a job and
would create more incentive for the employer to eliminate harassment
from his work force.
In racial harassment actions there have been several cases in which
the employer disciplined or fired the harasser because of his conduct.
39
Comparable action by employers is appropriate and necessary in cases
of sexual harassment. Aggressive use of the court's equitable powers is
37. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 476 F. Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 1979), where the court
ordered reinstatement in spite of intense sexual harassment and protracted litigation.
38. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, - F.2d -, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 262 (10th Cir. 1980)
(front pay appropriate remedy where reinstatement is impractical due to hostility between
parties); EEOC v. Kahir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd, 559
F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977) (plaintiff denied reinstatement due
to erosion of necessary trust and confidence, but granted one year's salary as front pay to give
her time to find comparable employment). But cf. Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 512 F.2d
850 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (front pay
inadequate remedy for unconstitutional discharge of homosexual teacher; only reinstatement
is sufficient to vindicate her ights and deter future unconstitutional action).
39. Harberson v. Monsanto Textiles Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 99 (D.S.C. 1976) (employer
discharged white Ku Klux Klan member for making racially derogatory remarks); Howard
v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (employer suspended
white employee for saying "nigger"). In Continental Can v. Minnesota, - Minn. -, 297
N.W.2d 241 (1980), although the employer in a sexual harassment case did suspend the
harassing employee for six weeks, this action was taken only after the Urban League
threatened to boycott the company.
[Vol. 8:30
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also required. In a recent racial discrimination case,4° for example, the
court found that although the employer had failed to renew plaintiffs
contract because of her race, there was no point in reinstating her in a
hostile work environment pervaded with racism. At that point, the
court determined that the. plaintiff had standing "not only to seek rein-
statement, but to seek to bp reinstated in a workplace where all people
are treated with decency and respect. '41 Instead of denying plaintiff
reinstatement, the court imposed a race-conscious hiring goal on the
employer. This was based on its finding that "as the environment ap-
proaches a fairer racial representation, the degree of racism tends to
diminish. '42 This creative use of the court's powers gives meaning to
the equitable concept of "complete justice."
Without adequate remedies, it will be impossible to eliminate dis-
crimination or to protect those who complain about harassment. In the
area of judicial remedies, the law of racial harassment and sexual har-
assment should develop in tandem.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF BLACK WOMEN
Sociological and Mythological Bases of Harassment
Black women have a unique position in American history and my-
thology which makes them extremely vulnerable to sexual harassment.
That position has been defined by the history of slavery and by the
social and psychological framework that made slavery possible. The
sexual exploitation of black women began during slavery, when they
were available to white men as sex objects and unable to seek protec-
tion from black men. They were both sexually accessible and unpro-
tected. Exploitation continued during the post-slavery era. Part of the
mythology created to support this exploitation portrayed the black wo-
man as "loose," exemplifying promiscuity and sexual abandon.43
Black women are still perceived as more promiscuous than white wo-
men. The white man who makes sexual demands on a black woman
often sees his power aggrandized by associating the sexual exploitation
to a period in history where a master-slave relationship was possible.'
Black men, who are still forbidden to defend themselves actively, 45 are
also forbidden to come to the defense of black women who are being
harassed.46 Black women, thus, are denied both the real and the sym-
40. Taylor v. Jones, 495 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
41. Id at 1294.
42. Id
43. G. LERNER, BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 149-50, 163-64 (1972).
44. In Continental Can, one harasser of a black woman co-worker made frequent references to a
movie about slavery and told her that "he wished slavery days would return so that he could
sexually train her and she would be his bitch." Continental Can v. Minnesota, - Minn. -,
297 N.W.2d at 246.
45. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
46. The court noted in Continental Can v. Minnesota, - Minn. -, 297 N.W.2d 241 (1980), that
it was denying plaintiff reinstatement and reducing her backpay by half due to two incidents
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bolic protection of black men. The history of slavery still marks black
women as sexually available, sexually promiscuous, and unprotected
by black men.
The second factor that makes black women susceptible to harass-
ment also emanates from the history of slavery and oppression: it is the
economic vulnerability of black women. Fifty-three percent of all
black women are in the work force. Compared to white men and wo-
men and black men, their median salary is the lowest.4 7 In 1978, ap-
proximately one out of eight female workers was a head of a family;
yet, one quarter of all black women workers were heads of house-
holds.48
More than half of the families headed by black women had incomes
below the poverty level in 1977 (58%). a9 In addition, one-third of all
black children under the age of eighteen are living in families headed
by black women that are below the poverty level." The highest unem-
ployment rate for any group is for black female teenagers (41% in
1978); the highest unemployment rate for all adults is black women
(11.1% in 1978).- t Taken all together, these statistics portray a situation
of despair and economic vulnerability. They indicate that black wo-
men are largely either looking for work or employed in marginal jobs,
earning low wages. At the same time black women are very often the
sole support of the family. 2 Sexual harassment takes on an even more
sinister tone when the threat of losing a job is seen against this desper-
ate background.
Statistics on the sexual harassment of black women are scarce. The
one large-scale study of sexual harassment which asked questions relat-
ing to race was conducted by the Merit Systems Protection Board. In
its initial report, the Board concluded that black and white women in
the federal government suffer sexual harassment to approximately the
same degree. 3 While this may be true in the federal sector, it should
not be expanded to a general proposition covering the work force as a
whole. The federal sector is unique in terms of the safeguards built
into the system to protect the rights of the employees. For black wo-
which added to tensions and racial hostilities. Id at 1816. Both incidents involved plaintiff's
husband, a black man, when he took an active role in defending his wife.
Black women are also frequently sexually harassed by black men. To the extent that
there are several groups of men who have power over black women, black women will be
sexually vulnerable to all of them. Attitudes towards black women, attitudes which are
shaped by the thoughts and behavior of the dominant group (white males), will come to be
attitudes accepted by the culture as a whole. Cf. W. JORDAN, supra note 13, at 150.
47. TWENTY FACTS, supra note 4, at 1; EARNINGS GAP, supra note 6, at 20.
48. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN OF HOUSEHOLDS AND
HEADS OF FAMILIES (Dec. 1979); TWENTY FACTS, supra note 4, at 2.
49. WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 48, at 8.
50. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME, Ser.
P-60, No. 124, Table 9 (1980).
51. TWENTY FACTS, supra note 4, at 8.
52. For further discussion of the unique situation of black women workers, see P. WALLACE,
BLACK WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (1980).
53. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, supra note 8, at 9.
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men, these jobs are probably the best that they can find. In the private
sector, black women, of all groups studied, were found to have the
highest chance of working for the minimum wage or less. 54 Whereas
the largest number of white working women are in clerical jobs, the
largest number of black women are in service jobs. More than half of
the household workers in the country are black.55 Many service occu-
pations, such as that of household worker, place black women in iso-
lated, invisible jobs which have few, if any, built-in protections, jobs in
which they are neither entitled to nor dare to ask for the minimum
wage. These are positions in which women are vulnerable to both eco-
nomic and sexual exploitation. In fact, a recent article in the Washing-
ton Post concerning the movement to professionalize household
workers revealed that sexual harassment is chronic and common-
place.56 Sexual harassment, like incidents of rape, is underreported due
to the victim's feelings of embarrassment and impotence and also to the
realities of her economic vulnerability.57 To the extent that black wo-
men are even less powerful and more economically vulnerable than
white women, the incidence of sexual harassment against black women
will show gross underreporting.58
Legal Analysis
Courts, when confronted with an allegation of sexual harassment
raised by a black women, often have grappled with the question of
whether they were dealing with sex discrimination or race discrimina-
tion. This confusion is not surprising, as the legislative history of Title
VII shows Congress' uncertainty with regard to treating black women
as blacks or as women for purposes of the Act.5 9 In Miller v. Bank of
America,60 plaintiff alleged that she was fired because she refused her
supervisor's demand for sexual favors from a "black chick." Plaintiff
alleged racial and sexual discrimination and filed suit under both Title
VII and section 1981. The district court, however, dismissed the section
54. MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMM'N, A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MINIMUM WAGE WORK-
ERS 10 (Sept. 1980).
55. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD WORKERS: A
STATISTICAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROFILE (1978).
56. Wiener, Careers. Standing Upfor Household Technicians, Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1980,
at B-5.
57. 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 96, 166 (testimony of Eleanor H. Norton and Ruth T.
Prokop).
58. Many black women, nonetheless, have been active in protecting themselves against sexual
harassment. It is interesting to note that although relatively few sexual harassment cases
have been appealed through the courts, three of the five Circuit Courts of Appeals cases on
sexual harassment were brought by black women; in several lower court decisions, the plain-
tiffs are identified as black. This activism is probably due both to the greater or more severe
harassment visited upon black women and the black woman's long familiarity with discrimi-
nation and willingness to seek redress through the courts.
59. The legislative history of Titles VII and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can be found in
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19641 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2355, 2401, 2408; S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2355, 2401, 2408.
60. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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1981 claim, stating that it was not a racial discrimination case and that
plaintiff had conceded that only sexual discrimination was involved.6'
On appeal, the court found that plaintiff had made no such concession
and reinstated her claim of racial discrimination.62 In Munford v.
James T Barnes & Co. ,63 plaintiff alleged both sexual and racial dis-
crimination, arguing that sociological studies showed that she was more
likely to be a victim of sexual harassment because she was black. The
district court granted a motion for summary judgment on the racial
discrimination claim, allowing only the sexual discrimination claim to
remain in the case.6 In the Continental Can case,65 although plaintiff
alleged only sexual discrimination, the verbal abuse showed clear racial
overtones. Finally, there is some indication that employees of agencies
who investigate charges of harassment mislead black women on how to
file their charges, based on the perception that one must choose either
sex or race as a basis for the complaint.66
Because black women are often harassed due to both race and sex,
they should not be foreclosed from defining discrimination against
them in such terms. A representative of the Working Women's Insti-
tute, an independent resource and research center that is in the fore-
front of work on sexual harassment, stated that the majority of black
women who come to the Institute with complaints of sexual harassment
suspect that they are dealing with instances of sex-race discrimination.
This is manifested either implicitly, so that the woman is unsure
whether the harassment is racially or sexually motivated, or explicitly,
where the harasser expressed his sexual interest in terms of her race.67
One district court has held that black women who filed a class ac-
tion suit under both Title VII and section 1981 are not a special sub-
category entitled to protection and that "they should not be allowed to
combine statutory remedies to create a new 'super-remedy' which
would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statutes
intended. '68 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted in dicta that it did
not subscribe entirely with the district court's reasoning in rejecting the
sex-race claim.69
61. 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
62. 600 F.2d at 212.
63. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
64. Id at 466-67.
65. - Minn. -, 297 N.W.2d 241 (1980).
66. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), where the agency EEO officer
advised plaintiff to file on the basis of race only.
67. Interview with Peggy Crull, Research Director of the Working Women's Institute, in New
York City (Nov. 11, 1980).
68. Degraffenreid v. General Motors Corp., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), a. 'dinpart, rev'd
inpart, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977). The EEOC participated as amicus curiae in the Degraf-
fenreid case on appeal, and argued that Title VII is available to eliminate all discriminatory
practices in whatever form they appear, including race and sex discrimination against black
women. The Commission has long supported the concept of sex-race discrimination. See,
e.g., EEOC Dec. No. 72-0679, [19711 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6,324; EEOC Dec. No. 72-0320,
[1971] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6,294.
69. Degraffenreid v. General Motors Corp., 558 F.2d at 484.
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The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has recognized the unique
legal predicament of black women. Its opinion in Jeffries v. Harris
County Community Action Association7°  states in part that
"[rlecognition of black females as a distinct protected subgroup for pur-
poses of the prima facie case and proof of pretext is the only way to
identify and remedy discrimination directed toward black females."7
The court based its decision on the language of the statute and the leg-
islative history, yet found its decision mandated by the holdings of the
Supreme Court in the "sex plus" cases.
The "sex plus" cases involve employment policies that single out
certain subclasses of women for discriminatory treatment, for example,
women with children, married women, and pregnant women. The
court reasoned that it would be illogical to hold that although an em-
ployer could not discriminate against a "sex plus" subgroup, he would
be free to discriminate against the black female subgroup. As the court
stated, "[t]his would be a particularly illogical result, since the 'plus'
factors in the former categories are ostensibly 'neutral' factors, while
race itself is prohibited as a criterion for employment."72
Judge Randall differed from the majority of the panel on what she
called "combination discrimination." She stated first of all that there
was no legal authority to support a "combination discrimination"
claim.73 Nevertheless, one can find several examples in which courts
have found a cause of action for combination discrimination.74 Sec-
ondly, Judge Randall argued that the factual differences between sex-
plus discrimination and combination discrimination preclude the use of
the "sex plus" analysis in combination cases.75 The "sex plus" analysis
is helpful, however, for it requires that courts carefully examine Con-
gress' proscriptions and give full credit to those proscriptions. Congress
did not say explicitly that discrimination on the basis of "sex plus," for
example, marital status, would violate Title VII, but courts have devel-
oped a "sex plus" theory of discrimination that has found widespread
acceptance. What Congress did say, however, and quite explicitly, is
that neither discrimination on the basis of race nor on the basis of sex
will be allowed. Courts must heed this mandate and must eliminate
70. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. Id at 1034.
72. Id
73. Id at 1034-35 n.7.
74. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 416 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Miss. 1976), rev'dand vacated in part
on other grounds, af'd inpart, 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978)
(certification of class of black females alleging sex-race discrimination); Griffiths v. Hamp-
ton, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1976) (court has authority to fashion appropriate relief to black
female who alleged sex-race discrimination); Logan v. St. Luke's Hospital, 428 F. Supp. 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (black female established prima facie case of racial and/or sexual discrimi-
nation); Collins v. City of Los Angeles, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 594 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (statis-
tics are insufficient to show that black female was terminated because of racial and/or sexual
discrimination); Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank of Dallas, 409 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D.
Tex. 1976) (court suggests evidence of termination of black female "smacks of sexual as well
as racial discrimination," id at 1089).
75. 615 F.2d at 1033-34.
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these kinds of discrimination whether they appear as an individual
claim or in a combined form.7 6
Another example clarifies the issue. Title VII has been interpreted
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of "sex plus" age, for example,
in the airline stewardess cases.77 As age discrimination is no longer a
"plus," but has its own statutory basis in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,78 discrimination on the basis of sex-age is now com-
bination discrimination just as is sex-race discrimination. Could one
now argue that sex-age cases are entitled to less protection than before?
Such a conclusion would make a mockery of Congressional intent to
accord age discrimination even greater protection. Judge Randall's
view of sex-race claims would do the same. Finally, Judge Randall
cites the evidentiary problems involved in proving discrimination
against a subgroup of females.79 However, forcing a plaintiff to choose
between sexual or racial discrimination ensures that the evidence se-
lected will be both inappropriate and insufficient to prove the case.
Once the nature of the discrimination has been analyzed properly,
proving discrimination against black women as a group should be no
more difficult than proving discrimination against women with chil-
dren or women over forty.
It is important for courts and practitioners to understand that black
women often experience discrimination because of sex-race; it is even
more important that black women understand this fact. Without a
clear understanding of the underlying cause of whatever discrimination
is taking place, the discriminatee will not be able to focus attention and
investigation in a helpful way. Black women are in a unique position:
they may face discrimination based on race, sex, or sex-race. A clearer
understanding of the existence of black women as a discrete group and
acceptance of this third category as a real possibility will make discrim-
ination against black women easier to identify and eliminate.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to clarify the nature of sexual harassment
by looking at it through the lens of race. In the process, the article has
shown that although sexual and racial harassment share many of the
same psychological and sociological underpinnings, the unique nature
76. In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that "mi enacting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit allpractices in whatever
form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, sex, or national origin .... " Id at 763 (emphasis added).
77. EEOC Dec. No. 66-5762, [1968] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6,001 (violation of Title VII to require
stewardesses to resign or accept reassignment at age 32); EEOC Dec. No. 70-38, 2 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 165 (1969) (violation of Title VII to require discharge of motorbus hostesses who
reach age 32); EEOC Dec. No. 70-167, [1969] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6,076 (requiring steward-
esses to resign at age 32 violates Title VII).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as amended by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189.
79. 615 F.2d at 1034-35, 1035 n.7.
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of the male-female interaction makes sexual harassment a more com-
plicated issue. To the extent that these similarities and differences are
understood, a clearer picture of the nature of sexual harassment
emerges. In order to provide clarity, the article has discussed two ana-
lytical models for sexual harassment cases: (a) a generalized harass-
ment model that is analogous to racial harassment, and (b) a sexual
exploitation model that is analogous to rape. By adopting these sug-
gested models, courts will be able to identify more clearly relevant evi-
dentiary matters, legal issues, and appropriate remedies.
Finally, this study has explored the unique situation of black wo-
men facing sexual harassment in the work force and has shown that
they are often exploited because of their sex and race. Recognition that
black women are a distinct group in American society and that sex-race
discrimination in employment exists is the first step in eradicating that
discrimination.
Discrimination in this country takes subtle, varied, and changing
forms. It is all, however, a totality. To the extent that we can grasp the
essence of discrimination, we can identify and eliminate its many mani-
festations.
1981]
